This is the report on the XVI BRAZILIAN LOGIC CONFERENCE (EBL 2011) held in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between May 9–13, 2011 published in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 18, Number 1, March 2012. -/- The 16th Brazilian Logic Conference (EBL 2011) was held in Petro ́polis, from May 9th to 13th, 2011, at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC). It was the sixteenth in a series of conferences that started in 1977 with the aim of (...) congregating logicians from Brazil and abroad, furthering interest in logic and its applications, stimulating cooperation, and contributing to the development of this branch of science. EBL 2011 included more than one-hundred and fifty participants, all of them belonging to prominent research institutes from Brazil and abroad, especially Latin America. The conference was sponsored by the Academia Brasileira de Ciências (ABC), the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic (ASL), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Sciences (CLE), Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC), Pontif ́ıcia Universidade Cato ́lica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC- Rio), Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Funding was provided by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient ́ıfico e Tecnolo ́ gico (CNPq), Fundac ̧a ̃o de Amparo `a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), Fundação Euclides da Cunha (FEC), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The members of the Scientific Committee were: Mário Folhadela Benevides (COPPE- UFRJ), Fa ́bio Bertato (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Jean-Yves Béziau (UFRJ), Ricardo Bianconi (USP), Juliana Bueno-Soler (UFABC), Xavier Caicedo (Universidad de Los An- des), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio), Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Newton da Costa (UFSC, President), Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa (UFRG), Alexandre Costa-Leite (UnB), I ́tala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Marcelo Finger (USP), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC-Rio), Décio Krause (UFSC), João Marcos (UFRN), Ana Teresa de Castro Martins (UFC), Maria da Paz Nunes de Medeiros (UFRN), Francisco Miraglia (USP), Luiz Car- los Pereira (PUC-Rio and UFRJ), Elaine Pimentel (UFMG), and Samuel Gomes da Silva (UFBA). The members of the Organizing Committee were: Anderson de Araujo (UNICAMP), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio, Co- chair), Marcelo Correa (UFF), Renata de Freitas (UFF), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC- RJ), Hugo Nobrega (COPPE-UFRJ), Luiz Carlos Pereira (PUC-Rio e IFCS/UFRJ), Leandro Suguitani (UNICAMP), Rafael Testa (UNICAMP), Leonardo Bruno Vana (UFF), and Petrucio Viana (UFF, Co-chair). (shrink)

Tendo em vista que a lei de ser em relação ao sujeito cognoscente consiste em ser-consciente, a consciência, segundo Jean-Paul Sartre, sobrepõe-se ao status de modo particular de conhecimento enquanto sentido interno ou conhecimento como conhecimento de si, constituindo a dimensão de ser transfenomenal. Dessa forma, baseado no princípio fenomenológico-ontológico-existencial, o Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano Da Rosa se detém na relação entre o fenômeno de ser e o ser do fenômeno e na irredutibilidade do ser do fenômeno ao fenômeno (...) do ser, assinalando o processo que sobrepõe o ser do fenômeno à condição fenomênica e converge para a consciência enquanto ser cognoscente enquanto é em um movimento que escapa ao enquanto é conhecido, transpondo as fronteiras da preeminência do conhecimento. Se a consciência emerge como consciência de alguma coisa em um processo cujo ser implica um ser que encerra a si como não consciente e transfenomenal, o que se impõe, segundo Sartre, não é senão a consciência como um ser que encerra a questão do seu ser enquanto ser que implica outro ser que não si mesmo. Assim, detendo-se no acontecimento da aparição do existente humano em relação ao ser enquanto descoberta de um mundo e a negação como momento essencial e primordial, o artigo assinala o motivo pelo qual o existente humano em seu ser implica a possibilidade de aparição do nada em um processo que encerra a liberdade como condição para a nadificação do nada. (shrink)

In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...) the assumption that computational systems are necessarily heteronomous systems, to try and motivate in enactivism a more nuanced and less rigid conception of computational systems, and to demonstrate to computational theorists that they might find some interesting material within the enactivist tradition, despite its historical hostility towards computationalism. (shrink)

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

Detendo-se no pecado enquanto construção histórico-cultural e sociorreligiosa em um processo que encerra os seus aspectos mítico-religiosos, o artigo assinala que o conceito que expressa a sua noção guarda raízes nas fronteiras envolvendo o fracasso humano no sentido de corresponder ao arcabouço paradigmático e o seu sistema de tabus, leis e códigos morais. Dessa forma, convergindo para os aspectos etimológico-literários e bíblico-religiosos do pecado, o artigo sublinha que, encerrando o sentido de errar o alvo, a tradução do referido termo como (...) “pecado” mantém correspondência com a transposição textual instaurada pela versão Septuaginta em um movimento de abstração da noção de culpa moral. Baseado na leitura dos aspectos filosófico-teológicos do pecado em Paul Ricoeur, o artigo sublinha que o pecado não consiste em um termo capaz de esgotar o sentido da realidade que implica como símbolo da ruptura entre essência e existência, convergindo para a sua caracterização como símbolo do mal e “grandeza mítica” através de uma construção que assinala o pecado enquanto intersecção envolvendo o mal e o mundo e atribui a sua emergência ao ato e determina a sua identificação como produto e simultaneamente causa. Assim, detendo-se nos aspectos bíblico-teológicos do pecado em Paul Tillich e na construção do conceito como alienação entre a “não-fé” e o “não-amor”, o artigo enfatiza o caráter irredutível da concepção que, segundo o Apóstolo Paulo, encerra a condição de um poder quase pessoal que controla este mundo, o que implica a sobreposição de um estado de coisas caracterizado pela objetividade e a configuração do acontecimento ora designado como ruptura envolvendo essência e existência em um movimento que possa representar a separação humana do “Ser-em-Si” e expressar o elemento de responsabilidade pessoal imbricado em sua dinâmica existencial. (shrink)

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

Against certain positivistic and neopositivistic strictures still rooted in our society, Agazzi argues that knowing the invisible is possible, not just in science, but also in metaphysics, in morals, in aesthetics, and in other areas, including, in a sense, religion. The book also examines many examples of such knowledge, surveying not only the great classics of philosophy, but various immortal masterpieces of art, music and literature. It is not just a treatise in epistemology, but a book of philosophy in the (...) most complete and traditional sense, for it discusses knowledge not only for its own sake, but also as a guide to culture, morality, happiness and to the sense of life. Thus, it also provides some important suggestions on how to face our time of crisis and an uncertain future. Despite Agazzi’s proverbial rigor and clarity, his project is so momentous and demanding that I discuss certain points which might deserve further explication and argumentation. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Constituting the object or content of New Testament preaching, salvation is made available by the kerygma as a proclamation of the Gospel that concludes God’s saving act and implies an exhortation to conversion that is based on the person and work of Jesus as Christ and Lord and Son of God and the soteriological facts of his death and resurrec-tion. In this way, Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano Da Rosa, faced with the issue involving the primacy of either the historical-Christological (...) tradition or the pneumatic-Christological preaching, points out that preaching converges to kerygmatic communication as a public announcement in relation to the promise and claims of the salvific event, converging to a tradition that witnesses salvific processes based on faith, constituting the Gospel as a pneumatic-kerygmatic tradition. Thus, the article focuses on the Christological kerygma as an event that encloses God as loquitur in Barth, which consists of an announcement involving an event yet to be realized (Ankündigung) in a process that presupposes that God speaks through a relationship that attributes to the human the function of announ-cing (Ankündigen) such a situation. Overriding the meaning that the kerygma of Jesus as the Messiah contains as content that imposes itself on the Old Testament tradition under the meaning of an additional ethical-religious and literary-theological value, the proclamation, according to Bultmann, constitutes the primary and basic that gives its character both in relation to ancient tradition and in relation to the preaching of Jesus in a process that maintains the entire past under another interpretative principle. In this way, overriding historical phenomena and their mere description, Bultmann elaborates a theological-philosophical construction that, through the use of scientific thought and the establishment of an existential interpretation, ends the claim of highlighting the true meaning of the message, converging on the borders that expose the current situation of human beings and the need for faith as decision and obedience. (shrink)

This is the BJPS Short Read version of the article When Fields Are Not Degrees of Freedom. In our article, Vera Hartenstein and I show that the world of classical electromagnetism might differ radically from the one we see in physics textbooks and experience day-to-day. First, light may not exist; second, the laws of electromagnetism are either incomplete or completely different; and, third, the mathematics needed to make exact calculations with these novel laws is in early development and not part (...) of the general mathematics curriculum at colleges and universities. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

Deployment Realism resists Laudan’s and Lyons’ objections to the “No Miracle Argument” by arguing that a hypothesis is most probably true when it is deployed essentially in a novel prediction. However, Lyons criticized Psillos’ criterion of essentiality, maintaining that Deployment Realism should be committed to all the actually deployed assumptions. But since many actually deployed assumptions proved false, he concludes that the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism fail. I reply that the essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor. In (...) fact, there is a simpler formulation of essentiality which escapes Lyons’ criticisms and rescues the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism from their purported historical counterexamples: a hypothesis is essential when it has no proper parts (in Yablo’s sense) sufficient to derive the same prediction. Although essentiality so conceived cannot be detected prospectively, this is just natural, and it is not a problem but an advantage for Deployment Realism. (shrink)

We argue that the asymmetry between diverging and converging electromagnetic waves is just one of many asymmetries in observed phenomena that can be explained by a past hypothesis and statistical postulate (together assigning probabilities to different states of matter and field in the early universe). The arrow of electromagnetic radiation is thus absorbed into a broader account of temporal asymmetries in nature. We give an accessible introduction to the problem of explaining the arrow of radiation and compare our preferred strategy (...) for explaining the arrow to three alternatives: (i) modifying the laws of electromagnetism by adding a radiation condition requiring that electromagnetic fields always be attributable to past sources, (ii) removing electromagnetic fields and having particles interact directly with one another through retarded action-at-a-distance, (iii) adopting the Wheeler-Feynman approach and having particles interact directly through half-retarded half-advanced action-at-a-distance. In addition to the asymmetry between diverging and converging waves, we also consider the related asymmetry of radiation reaction. (shrink)

In the scientific communities most criticisms are constructive, while they are destructive in the humanistic circles. Indeed, scientists circulate their drafts among colleagues and students, hoping to elicit their comments and suggestions before submitting their work to publication. In contrast, philosophers and political thinkers attack their rivals, without sparing arguments ad hominem or even insults. The reason for this difference is that scientists are after the truth, whereas most humanists fight for more or less noble causes, from swelling their own (...) curricula to joining crusades for or against rationality, realism, justice, or what have you. (shrink)

Philosophy is sometimes perceived as an abstract and nerdy discipline dealing with problems of its own creation in an isolated chamber of the Ivory Tower. And there is some truth to this view. But philosophy can help us deal with common problems, such as the disagreements we have in our everyday lives.

Este artigo constitui uma reflexão acerca desta central e controversa afirmação contida na terceira parte de Verdade e Método segundo a qual "ser que pode ser compreendido é linguagem". Depois de apresentar uma tríplice leitura dessa mesma afirmação, concretamente na sua dimensão platónica, kantiana, e hegeliana, o artigo procura sobretudo desenvolver uma leitura ontológica da mesma. É assim que, partindo dessa tríplice leitura, o presente trabalho intenta justificar e fundamentar a Ontologia hermenêutica de Gadamer, a qual considera ser, para além (...) de diferente, mais autêntica que a Onto-teologia aristotélica e a Ontologia fundamental heideggeriana. Dessa forma, o artigo intenta fazer, a partir da obra de Hans-Georg Gadamer, uma descrição da Hermenêutica filosófica a partir da afirmação segundo a qual "ser que pode ser compreendido é linguagem". /// Aim of the present article is to reflect upon this central and controversial statement, taken from the third part of Truth and Method, according to which "being that can be unterstood is language". After presenting three possible readings of the above mentioned statement, namely the Platonic, the Kantian, and the Hegelian, the article proceeds to develop an onto logical reading of the same passage. Thus, on the basis of these readings, the article both justifies and grounds the gadamerian hermeneutical ontology, which it considers as being different from and more authentic than both the Aristotelian onto-theology and the Heideggerian fundamental ontology. The paper, finally, describes how the notion of philosophical Hermeneutics, as it is found in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, is summarized in the affirmation according to which "being that can be unterstood is language". (shrink)

A discussion of Wolfgang's Stegmüller's ideas on the structuralist conception of theories, especially as presented in his book The Structure and Dynamics of Theories (Springer, 1976).

The article works out the thesis that to the excessive desire of the powerful for the absolute appropriation/domination it is opposed a not less excessive and absolute desire from people in order not to be appropriated/dominated: two desires of a distinct nature which are neither the desire for the same things nor the desire for different things, but desires in which the act of desiring is different. Taking into account that each desire aims at its absolute effectiveness, each one of (...) them tries to impose itself universally becoming doubly absolute: for one side it is inclined to the absolute domination (the powerful) or to the plain liberty (the people); for the other side, tries to impose itself to the whole political body. Each desire is only sustained by its heterogeneous desire. Each one pursues its own purposes whose realization will be the ruin of all collective life. Good institutions and good laws ensure liberty as long as they are capable to prevent the powerful or the people to consummate its desire or abandon its own desire to assume the other’s. However, having inscribed the order of law in the disorder of dissent, Machiavelli discarded the idea of an institutional order as a defi nitive solution to the disorder of dissent. Consequently, no law or institution is able to defi nitively resist the risk of corruption. This requires a periodic return to the origins: the experience of the constitutive moment of the original violence which, exposing men to risks, restores the initial reputation and strength of States and institutions. -/- O artigo parte da enunciação da tese de que ao desejo desmesurado dos grandes pela apropriação/dominação absoluta opõe-se um desejo não menos desmesurado e absoluto do povo de não sê-lo: dois desejos de natureza diferente que não são nem o desejo das mesmas coisas nem desejo de coisas diferentes, mas desejos cujo ato de desejar é diferente. Considerando que cada desejo visa sua efetividade absoluta, cada um tenta se impor universalmente tornando-se duplamente absoluto: por um lado, tende à dominação total (os grandes) ou à liberdade plena (o povo); por outro, tenta se impor ao conjunto do corpo político. Cada desejo somente se sustenta do desejo que lhe é heterogêneo. Cada um persegue uma fi nalidade própria cuja realização plena será a ruína de toda vida coletiva. Boas instituições e boas leis asseguram a liberdade na medida em que forem capazes de impedir que grandes ou povo consumam seu desejo ou que abandonem seu desejo próprio para assumir o do outro. Contudo, ao inscrever a ordem da lei na desordem dos dissensos, Maquiavel descartou a ideia de uma ordem institucional como solução defi nitiva da desordem dos dissensos. Consequentemente, nenhuma lei ou instituição é capaz de resistir defi nitivamente ao risco da corrupção. Isso obriga ao retorno periódico às origens: a experiência do momento constitutivo da violência originária que, expondo os homens ao risco, restaura o prestígio e vigor iniciais de Estados e instituições. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende inserir a História da Psicologia dentro de um debate mais alargado, em torno das Histórias da Filosofia e das Ciências. Para isso, o objeto de análise é a célebre frase de Ebbinghaus, 'A Psicologia tem um longo passado, mas uma curta história', e toda a tradição de livros e textbooks decorrente dela, muito popular nos séculos XX e XXI. O trabalho analisará o texto de Ebbinghaus e seus compromissos decorrentes. Então realizará uma crítica a essa tradição, (...) em três frentes: primeiramente, trazendo à tona estudos mais recentes sobre Gustav Fechner, encarado como figura central na constituição da Psicologia como ciência, mas não obstante ignorado por seus compromissos 'especulativos'; em segundo lugar, confrontando tais questões com as perspectivas do século XX, especialmente a história epistemológica das ciências; finalmente, abrindo o 'longo passado' a uma história mais alargada, a partir de analistas mais contemporâneos que começaram a perscrutar o próprio termo 'Psicologia'. ____________________________________________________________________________________________ This paper intends to insert the History of Psychology in a wider debate along with the History of Philosophy and History of Science. In order to do that, the object of analysis is Hermann Ebbinghaus’s famous phrase, ‘Psychology has an old past, but a short history’, and all the tradition of books and textbooks due to it, very popular on the 20th and 21st centuries. The paper is going to analyse Ebbinghaus’s text and its historical commitments and consequences. Then will perform a critics of this tradition, in 3 fronts of arguments: firstly, bringing up some more recent studies on Gustav Fechner, seen as a central character on the making of Psychology as a science, but nevertheless ignored for its ‘speculative’ commitments. Secondly, the paper will confront such questions with the historical perspectives of 20th century, specially the epistemological history of science. Finally, the paper will open the argument of ‘old past’ to a more wide ‘history’, showing contemporary analysts who started to scan the historical meaning of the word ‘Psychology’. (shrink)

Detendo-se no pecado em Pelágio como possibilidade enquanto exercício da liberdade e responsabilidade individual, o artigo assinala a defesa da neutralidade envolvendo a criação do ser humano e a sua capacidade para o bem e o mal, sublinhando a liberdade da vontade e a sua absoluta indeterminação, o que atrela o pecado à escolha. Portanto, atribuindo à vontade a condição de locus da instauração da experiência ético-lógico existencial envolvendo o exercício da liberdade, Pelágio se contrapõe a tese do pecado original (...) enquanto herança psico-biológica, intelecto-afetiva e volitivo-consciencial transmitida pelo arquétipo humano em Adão para a sua descendência. Dessa forma, assinalando a vontade como a causa do pecado em um movimento que converge para encerrar a sua imputação ao agente enquanto detentor da vontade em exercício, o texto mostra que Agostinho afirma, paradoxalmente, a tendência humana para a prática do mal como resultante da herança adâmica, que impõe a sua posteridade a condição de absoluta depravação e inescapável culpa, na medida em que o ser humano é constituído enquanto tal em estado de santa inocência em um processo que atribui ao pecado a condição de um produto da escolha humana através do exercício de sua liberdade e plena consciência. Finalizando, a pesquisa examina o pecado como símbolo racionalentre Pelágio e Agostinho segundo Paul Ricoeur, que afirma a necessidade de um processo que seja capaz de desconstruir o conceito em função da emergência da intenção ortodoxa enquanto sentido reto e eclesial. (shrink)

[Both this and the Castilian versions are translations of the editor from a paper originally written in English that will appear in the Anual Review 6]. Aquest article explora alguns aspectes de l'estudi científic de la creativitat centrant-se en la creació d'humor lingüístic intencionat. Sostenim que aquest tipus de creativitat pot explicar-se dins d'un enfocament cognitiu influent, però que aquest marc no és una recepta per a produir exemples nous d'humor i fins i tot pot evitar-los. Començarem identificant tres grans (...) problemes que sorgeixen en tractar de precisar els trets centrals de la creativitat i algunes de les formes adoptades pels estudis cognitius en aquesta cerca. Després considerarem què anomenem «humor creatiu», que exhibeix les característiques centrals de la creativitat abans esmentada. Després investigarem com un enfocament cognitiu clau per a la comunicació humana pot explicar l'humor creatiu. Acaberem extraient conclusions i destacant les limitacions dels enfocaments cognitius per a entendre la creativitat. (shrink)

RESUMO: O presente texto põe algumas questões referentes à “história” dos fundamentos da Psicologia entre os séculos XIX e XX, mostrando como ocorrem ainda, em História da Psicologia, certos fatores controversos, muitos deles tributários de postulados filosóficos do século XIX, especialmente em torno do positivismo. O artigo concentra-se em mostrar, preliminarmente, de que forma a ruptura da Filosofia Natural e a ascensão da figura do “cientista” no século XIX ensejaram novos motivos de análise, dentre eles certo cientificismo que se impôs (...) inclusive como chave de interpretação histórica. Após uma exposição inicial do problema – chamando a atenção também às consequências institucionais, da formação à profissão –, o artigo faz três breves estudos de caso – em torno de Fechner, Helmholtz e Wundt – e termina por defender perspectivas que abram a História da Psicologia a histórias mais alargadas, tais como a História da Filosofia e as Histórias das Ciências._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ABSTRACT: The present work poses several questions concerning the history of Psychological’s foundations between 19th and 20th centuries, showing how there are still today certain controversial factors derived from 19th century philosophical postulates acting on the ways of describing psychology’s history, notably around positivism. The article concentrates in showing, in a preliminary way, how the rupture of Natural Philosophy of 18th century and the rise of the figure of the scientist in the 19th century gave rise to new analytical patterns, as well as a certain Scientism that tried to impose itself as the keystone to historical interpretation. The work begins with an initial exposition of the problem – calling into attention the institutional consequences as well, from the psychological common sense to professional issues -, and then analyzes three case studies - Gustav Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt – ending with the defense of perspectives that open the History of Psychology into another historical procedures, such as History of Philosophy and History of Sciences. (shrink)

O objetivo central deste estudo é fazer ressaltar as características dos conceitos de animismo, magia e feitiçaria a partir das perspectivas de Sigmund Freud e Bronislaw Malinowski. Em um primeiro momento, analisaremos o animismo. Em seguida, uma vez que as observações etnográficas de Malinowski divergem daquelas de Freud, examinaremos a magia e a feitiçaria com a finalidade de verificar não somente as divergências, mas também as convergências e as aproximações possíveis que existem entres estes dois pensadores e os próprios conceitos (...) entre si. Por fim, mostraremos o que está no centro dessas análises e quais são as razões que fundamentam esses métodos e as resistências que eles podem suscitar. (shrink)

I analyze the meaning of mass in Newtonian mechanics. First, I explain the notion of primitive ontology, which was originally introduced in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Then I examine the two common interpretations of mass: mass as a measure of the quantity of matter and mass as a dynamical property. I claim that the former is ill-defined, and the latter is only plausible with respect to a metaphysical interpretation of laws of nature. I explore the following options for the (...) status of laws: Humeanism, primitivism about laws, dispositionalism, and ontic structural realism. (shrink)

Chez les scientifiques, la plupart des critiques sont constructives, alors qu’elles sont destructrices chez les humanistes. En effet, les scientifiques font circuler leurs brouillons entre collègues et étudiants, dans l’espoir de recueillir leurs commentaires et suggestions avant de soumettre leurs travaux à la publication. En revanche, les philosophes et les penseurs politiques attaquent leurs rivaux à coup d’arguments ad hominem et d’insultes. La raison de cette différence est que les scientifiques recherchent la vérité, alors que la plupart des humanistes se (...) battent pour des causes plus ou moins nobles, allant de la promotion de leur propre programme à la participation à des croisades pour ou contre la rationalité, le réalisme, la justice ou autre. (shrink)

This article deals with the most relevant philosophical side of Albert the Great’s analysis of alchemy, aimed at clarifying what alchemical transmutation consists in and whether this process can ultimately be accomplished by men. The Dominican master handles the problem differently in the earlier commentary on Lombardus’ Libri Sententiarum and in works like the De mineralibus, in which a more mature idea of the connection between art and nature is developed. In this respect, Albert’s interpretation intersects with Avicenna’s De congelatione, (...) a fundamental text for the Latin medieval debate on alchemy, whose reception has shaped his understanding of the alchemical art. The Dominican master gradually assumes a more lenient position towards the claims of the alchemical process of transmutation, which he explains by resorting to the similitudes between alchemy and medicine and the comparison of artificial transmutation with natural processes such as the generatio ex putrefactione and the natural formation of minerals. (shrink)

We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.

The paper attempts to bridge a gap between two prevalent conceptions of forgiveness that are widely thought to be in opposition. On one side of things, forgiveness is often characterized as a gift. The image is an ever-present one, enduring in popular culture no less than in the sober prose of analytic philosophy. But we also talk of forgiveness as a moral imperative, an important, even vital aspect of our moral life. I argue that, contrary to what may at first (...) appear, the two sides are not in tension, and each gets at something important about the nature of forgiveness. Forgiveness is indeed a gift but, much like actual gifts, it is one we are sometimes required to give. (shrink)

In this paper, we will make explicit the relationship that exists between geometric objects and geometric figures in planar Euclidean geometry. That will enable us to determine basic features regarding the role of geometric figures and diagrams when used in the context of pure and applied planar Euclidean geometry, arising due to this relationship. By taking into account pure geometry, as developed in Euclid’s Elements, and practical geometry, we will establish a relation between geometric objects and figures. Geometric objects are (...) defined in terms of idealizations of the corresponding figures of practical geometry. We name the relationship between them as a relation of idealization. This relation, existing between objects and figures, is what enables figures to have a role in pure and applied geometry. That is, we can use a figure or diagram as a representation of geometric objects or composite geometric objects because the relation of idealization corresponds to a resemblance-like relationship between objects and figures. Moving beyond pure geometry, we will defend that there are two other ‘layers’ of representation at play in applied geometry. To show that, we will consider Euclid’s Optics. (shrink)

El intento de estas páginas es el de seleccionar dentro de la semántica del miedo que contribuye a organizar la imagen moderna del orden político y jurídico el elemento específico del pánico, en la hipótesis de que este último constituya una diferencia que es asimismo un recurso epistémico. Dicho de un modo directo: si el miedo se presenta como una referencia constitutiva del orden, de su constitución como de su mantenimiento, el pánico parece, en cambio, cargado de un signo contrario; (...) nos habla de la disolución de un agregado dado por supuesto y es inclusivo en el perimetrar los límites y las condiciones de posibilidad. El objetivo es aquel de repasar algunos momentos de la historia del pánico buscando argumentar que el pánico es una pasión política, en el sentido de que se refiere a aquello de lo que la político está hecha, y al mismo tiempo es expresión de un límite "pasional" de la política, en tanto que define políticamente un límite interno. Respecto a tal objetivo, esta aportación no reivindica más que los caracteres de un hilvanado necesitante de un desarrollo ulterior por lo que se refiere no solo a aquello que no se incluye (y es obviamente mucho), sino también a los nudos que de forma conscientemente provisional se indican. Además, se limita a una periodizacion histórica que es de alguna manera preliminar, deteniéndose en el umbral de la fase en la cual el pánico es una palabra de un discurso disciplinar, es parte del objeto de un saber codificado (psicología, sociología, ciencia política), incluso si no desempeña necesariamente un rol apaciguador. (shrink)

There is not much of a consensus on almost anything about quantum mechanics. I take it, however, that the minimum consensus is that "although quantum mechanics is empirically successful, quantum mechanics is hard to understand." Quantum mechanics, in the way it is presented in most textbooks, does indeed not provide a clear picture of reality that would make it a theory to be understood. In her new book, "The World in the Wave Function: A Metaphysics for Quantum Physics," Alyssa Ney (...) tries to make this blurry picture of reality more precise, even if this picture will turn out to be heterodox and unfamiliar. (shrink)

In Latin Europe, the controversy over spontaneous generation of perfect animals – namely those whose breeding occurs through sexual reproduction – is received in different ways, varying from positions very close to Avicenna’s, as in the case of Pietro Pomponazzi, to interpretations that rather refer to Averroes’ perspective. To this ‘Averroist front’ undoubtedly belongs the figure of Urbano da Bologna, author of the Expositio commenti Averrois in VIII libros Physicorum – a work that can be defined a supercommentary to Averroes’ (...) Physica – composed in Bologna around 1334. The present study aims to provide the complete transcription of a quaestio that is present in the work – but which was disputed according to its author also in public – as an example of the elaboration of the theme of spontaneous generation in the early 14th century. The text deals with many aspects of the problem, especially elaborating on the correspondence between each specific form and its appropriate matter, in the light of the lively debates of the time, and reveals a mature understanding of Aristotle’s natural philosophy and its Averroist interpretation. (shrink)

In this paper we explore Ronald N. Giere’s contributions to the scientific realism debate. After outlining some of his general views on the philosophy of science, we locate his contributions within the traditional scientific realism debate. We argue that Giere’s scientific perspectivism is best seen as a form of carte blanche realism, that is: a view according to which science is a practice aiming at truth, and can warrantably claim to have attained it, to a certain degree; however, it does (...) not place our confidence invariably in some specific feature of scientific representations. (shrink)

Sobrepondo uma concepção crítica envolvendo os fundamentos do saber às ontologias dogmáticas que se impõem ao trabalho que implica a apreensão das questões filosóficas, o projeto kantiano propõe o fim da filosofia como construção metafísica e a necessidade de se lhe atribuir uma tarefa teórica de caráter essencialmente genealógico e crítico, no sentido que encerra a legitimação do conhecimento racional através da análise das faculdades que se lhe estão atreladas, conforme assinala o artigo, que se detém nos direitos da razão (...) cuja legitimidade a lógica da verdade reconhece e cuja ilegitimidade a lógica da aparência denuncia, convergindo para as fronteiras que encerram a possibilidade da construção do conhecimento científico, à medida que, tornando o entendimento o legislador universal da natureza e circunscrevendo a utilização das categorias aos limites da experiência possível, propõe as condições necessárias para fundá-lo sobre os juízos sintéticos a priori. (shrink)

É possível trabalhar com textos clássicos da filosofia no atual contexto das escolas públicas brasileiras? Se sim, como fazer uso desses textos? Quais as possibilidades e os limites para nossas pretensões, enquanto professores de filosofia, quanto ao uso do texto filosófico? Importantes teóricos do ensino de filosofia no Brasil, tal como Lidia Maria Rodrigo, Renata Aspis e Silvio Gallo, defenderam que os textos filosóficos não apenas podem e devem ser trabalhados em sala de aula, mas ainda que tais textos devem (...) ocupar papel central no ensino da disciplina. Cabe refletir sobre essa proposta a partir da realidade na qual estamos hoje inseridos, pretensão do texto que se segue e cujo objetivo é discutir as possibilidades e os limites do uso do texto filosófico a partir do relato de minha experiência no estágio em filosofia, que foi realizado em uma turma do segundo ano do Ensino Médio em uma escola pública da cidade de Santa Maria, RS. (shrink)